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Abstract 
 
Seasonal work programs are increasingly advocated by international aid agencies as a way of 
enabling both developed and developing countries to benefit from migration. They are argued 
to provide workers with new skills and allow them to send remittances home, without the 
receiving country having to worry about long-term assimilation and the source country 
worrying about permanent loss of skills. However, formal evidence as to the development 
impact of seasonal worker programs is non-existent. This paper provides the first such 
evaluation, studying New Zealand's new Recognized Seasonal Employer (RSE) program 
which allows Pacific Island migrants to work in horticulture and viticulture in New Zealand 
for up to seven months per year. We use baseline and follow-up waves of surveys we are 
carrying out in Tonga to form difference-in-difference and propensity score matching 
estimates of short-term impacts on household income and consumption. 
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I. Introduction 
 
A growing literature suggests that seasonal work programs (SWPs) are part of the new 
landscape of global agriculture that can be “win-win” for both developed and developing 
countries (GCIM, 2005; Pritchett, 2006). These SWPs appear to offer many of the benefits of 
migration – such as relieving labor shortages in developed countries and aiding development 
in developing countries - with few of the perceived costs - such as permanent loss of talent in 
developing countries, and social stress, fiscal costs and irreversibility in developed countries.  
 
Many countries have SWPs, with a 2003 ILO survey finding over 500 bilateral labor 
agreements.1 Amongst the most widely studied of these, the Canadian Seasonal Agriculture 
Workers Program (SAWP) has been recruiting Caribbean workers for over forty years, and 
Mexican workers since 1974 (Brem, 2006). The SAWP lets 20,000 seasonal migrants work in 
Canadian agriculture for up to eight months per year. Other examples include 5,500 Moroccan 
mothers, who pick strawberries in Spain for a four month season, and 16,500 Bulgarians and 
Romanians who fill summer jobs in UK agriculture under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers 
Scheme.2 Perhaps the largest program involves 300,000 Polish guestworkers who can work 
for up to four months in German agriculture (Hess, 2006). 
 
 But robust evidence on the development impact of seasonal worker programs is non-
existent. While claims are made about development impacts based on surveys of seasonal 
agricultural workers (Basok, 2000), these surveys lack baseline information from before the 
workers migrated and do not have control groups to see what would have happened to the 
supplying households in the absence of the seasonal migration. Similar methodological 
problems affect studies of internal seasonal migration, which typically rely on cross-sectional 
data with no way of controlling for migrant self-selectivity (Haberfeld, et al. 1999).3 
 
 In this paper we report more robust impact estimates, for New Zealand’s new 
Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme. The RSE began in 2007 and aims to aid 
economic development in the Pacific Islands while easing labor shortages in New Zealand’s 
horticulture and viticulture industries (Ramasamy et al, 2008). Under the RSE, up to 5000 
workers from eligible Pacific Island countries are recruited to work in New Zealand for seven 
months per eleven month period and can return in future seasons if recruited again. The 
employer pays half of the return airfare from the worker’s home country and provides 
stipulated minimum hours of work at hourly or piece rates typical of those received by local 
                                                 
1  UN Secretary-General, International Migration and Development Report. May 16 2006, p. 82.  
 
2  Rural Migration News July, 2007. http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=1228_0_4_0  
 
3  de Brauw and Harigaya (2007) are one example of internal seasonal migration being studied with 
panel data, but even in their example the first wave of the panel survey does not correspond to a 
pre-migration baseline. 
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workers for equivalent work in the same period and region. Typical jobs for RSE workers are 
pruning trees and vines, picking apples, citrus and grapes, and picking and packing kiwifruit. 
Employers also arrange internal transportation and accommodation, provide training and 
equipment, and look after other aspects of pastoral care for their seasonal workers. 
 
 Our impact estimates are based on two waves of a panel survey that we designed 
specifically for evaluating the RSE. The first wave provides baseline data on households 
before workers left for the first season in New Zealand. In addition to households with RSE 
workers, the samples also includes households with individuals who applied to participate in 
the RSE but were not recruited (henceforth “RSE applicants”), and households where no 
individuals applied to the RSE (henceforth “non-applicants”). These control groups allow us 
to deal with two types of selection which might otherwise confound the inferences: first there 
is a selection process by firms, labor agents and community leaders which determines which 
applicants are recruited from work-ready pools formed in the source countries. Second, any 
self-selection process, whereby households decide whether to have members apply for the 
RSE work-ready pool, can be studied by comparing with the non-applicants. 
 
 Although our surveys are fielded in the two Pacific countries supplying most workers 
under the RSE – Vanuatu and Tonga, the estimates reported here are restricted to Tonga. Over 
two-thirds of the Tongan RSE workers in our sample had returned home when the second 
wave of our survey was fielded (April-June, 2008) compared with only 20 percent of the 
Vanuatu workers. It is expensive to send money from New Zealand to the Pacific, with the 
transactions costs for popular money transfer operators like Western Union averaging at least 
15 percent (Gibson, McKenzie and Rohorua, 2006). Consequently many RSE workers bring 
most of their earnings home in person, rather than sending them from in New Zealand. 
Therefore it is not possible to observe the full impact of RSE work on source household 
incomes until the worker has returned at the end of each season. The impacts for the Vanuatu 
households and for those Tongans who had not yet returned by the second wave of our survey 
will be captured by the third survey wave, which went into the field in October 2008. 
 
We restrict attention to estimating impacts, in the form of average treatment effects on 
the treated (ATT), on household incomes and consumption. We do not yet attempt to estimate 
broader, community-level impacts on inequality or poverty. However prior analysis of the 
baseline data showed that Tongan workers coming through the RSE are poorer, more rural 
and less schooled than Tongans not participating in the RSE (Gibson et al., 2008).4 Hence any 
positive impacts on household income resulting from participation in the RSE are likely to be 
pro-poor. 
                                                 
4 In contrast, McKenzie et al. (2008) show that although RSE workers from Vanuatu coming to New 
Zealand are mostly male subsistence farmers with limited schooling, they are still from wealthier 
households and have better English literacy than the average ni-Vanuatu. 
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II. Data 
 
Our survey has near national coverage, covering the main island of Tongatapu, and two of the 
three outer island groups (Vava’u and ‘Eua). Collectively these three islands contain 
90 percent of the population and contributed 92 percent of the RSE workers in the first 
season. The sampled villages were based on lists of RSE workers and their villages obtained 
from the Tongan Labour Ministry. The town officer in each village provided directions to 
households with RSE workers and a random subset of these were interviewed. In each village 
we also used the town officers to identify households with RSE applicants who were part of 
the work-ready pool but who had not been recruited, and we additionally surveyed households 
where all members were non-applicants.  
 
 In total our baseline survey covered 448 households containing 2,335 individuals in 46 
villages. The first follow-up survey re-interviewed 442 of these households. Of these, 181 had 
a RSE worker (114 where the worker had returned by the wave 2 survey), 116 had a member 
of the work-ready pool who had not been recruited, and 145 had only non-applicants. Table 1 
summarizes baseline household-level characteristics for these four sample groups, along with 
two-sample t-tests for differences in means between the samples.  
 
Returned RSE
(a) (d)   
Household size 5.89 5.54 4.97 *** 4.74 ***
Adult (>14 years) share of household 0.65 0.59 0.72 ** 0.68
Male share of adults 0.55 0.56 0.51 ** 0.52
Share of adults literate in English 0.93 0.95 0.90 0.96
Share of adults with schooling beyond Grade 10 0.46 0.38 * 0.49 0.47
Share of adults who previously visited New Zealand 0.36 0.38 0.19 *** 0.17 ***
Average days of hard physical labor/person/week 4.94 3.44 *** 4.11 *** 4.12 ***
Number of pigs owned 6.04 5.07 5.46 5.39
Number of chickens owned 5.82 4.04 * 4.91 5.35
Number of cattle owned 0.54 0.36 0.47 0.42
Number of vehicles owned 0.58 0.63 0.62 0.68
Per capita total household incomea 844 803 1093 ** 1247 ***
Per capita total household consumptiona 805 877 993 ** 1294 **
Sample size 114 67 116 145
Table 1: Baseline Characteristics and Monetary Welfare Levels of Tongan Households with RSE Workers, Applicants and Non-Applicants
Note: The "returned RSE" households are those where the worker had returned to Tonga by wave 2 of the survey while the "RSE still in NZ" are households where the worker 
was still at the time of wave 2 of the survey.  
aThe components of total household income and total household consumption are shown in Table 2 below.  The income and consumption estimates are semi-annual.
*** = significant at 0.01, ** = significant at 0.05, * = significant at 0.1 for comparison with the mean for the returned RSE households.
RSE still in NZ Applicants Non-applicants
(b) (c)
 
  
The households where RSE workers had already returned from their season in New Zealand 
had similar baseline welfare levels and largely similar baselines characteristics to those 
households whose workers were still completing their New Zealand contracts (as seen from 
columns (a) and (b)). The only differences are that those still in New Zealand came from 
households with slightly lower adult schooling levels and fewer chickens owned, and where 
adults had worked fewer days of hard physical labor at the time of the baseline survey. These 
differences should not affect the inferences derived from the two-thirds of RSE households 
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with returned workers, although a more complete set of impact estimates will be possible once 
the wave 3 data are available. 
 
In contrast, there are substantial differences between the RSE households and either 
applicant or non-applicant households. The average per capita incomes were over 250 pa’anga 
higher at baseline in applicant households and over 400 pa’anga higher in non-applicant 
households.5 The gap in per capita consumption was almost as large. These differences in per 
capita resources come from both a larger household size for RSE workers and also lower total 
incomes. Accounting for these pre-existing differences will be important for valid estimates of 
the impact of RSE work on household incomes. The other main differences in characteristics 
are that RSE households have more previous experience of visiting New Zealand and also 
(amongst returnees) had spent more days per week engaged in hard physical labor at the time 
of the baseline survey. 
 
III. Estimation Method  
 
Let iY1 and iY0  be the income of a household in two counterfactual situations: the treatment 
)1( =iT  of sending a household member to work in New Zealand under the RSE and non-
treatment ).0( =iT  For a set of observable covariates, iX  let )( iXP  be the propensity score, 
defined as: .)1Pr()( iii XTXP =≡  The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) can be 
estimated as: 
 
[ ]{ }
[ ] [ ]{ }1)(,0)(,1
)(,1
01
01
==−==
=−≡
iiiiiii
iiii
TXPTYEXPTYEE
XPTYYEEATT
     (1) 
 
which is interpreted as the expected gain in income for households with RSE workers 
compared with what their income would have been if not recruited. Conceptually the ATT 
requires a mean for the unobservable counterfactual, [ ]10 =ii TYE  so for the observable 
quantities in equation (1) to identify the ATT relies on three key conditions introduced into 
the literature by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
 
 First is “unconfoundedness” ( ),, 10 iiii XTYY ⊥  where ⊥ denotes independence. 
According to this, potential outcomes are independent of treatment, conditional on the 
observable covariates, .iX  Given observable covariates, assignment to the treatment group is 
treated as random and any systematic differences in actual outcomes between treated and non-
                                                 
5  These income estimates are for a semi-annual period. In terms of international currencies, 
approximate exchange rates during the time of the survey are 1 NZD = 1.5 Pa’anga and 1 USD = 
1.9 Pa’anga. 
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treated individuals with the same value of the covariates is attributed to the treatment. Second 
is “common support” where all treated households have a counterpart in the non-treatment 
group for each iX for which we seek to make a comparison.
6 This condition would appear to 
create a dimensionality problem when many covariates are matched on; for example, if 
iX contains k covariates which are all dichotomous the number of possible matches will be 
.2k  However the propensity score reduces the dimensionality of the matching problem 
because it is possible to match on )( iXP which is scalar, rather than on the vector of 
observable variables .iX  This use of )( iXP  is valid so long as the “balancing” property 
( ) ( )( )pXPTXprobpXPTXprob iiiiii ===== )(,0)(,1  holds (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983). In other words, conditional on the propensity score, the means of the covariates should 
be identical across the treatment and control groups if the balancing property holds. 
 
 Since the propensity score is a continuous variable it is unlikely that there are two 
observations with exactly the same value of ),( iXP  so further refinement is needed to 
estimate equation (1). We use a “kernel matching” procedure, following Dehejia and Wahba 
(2002) where all treated households are matched with a weighted average of non-treated 
households, with weights inversely proportional to the gap between propensity scores of the 
treated and non-treated. The literature comparing propensity score matching with 
experimental benchmarks also notes that performance is better if treatment and control groups 
are located in the same labor markets, are administered the same questionnaire and if data is 
collected from both the pre- and post-treatment periods so a ‘difference-in-differences’ 
estimator can be used to control for unobserved differences between the treatment and control 
groups. All of these features are present in the survey that we use, with a common 
questionnaire obtaining baseline pre-migration and follow-up post-migration information and 
fielded in villages that supply both the treatment and control groups. 
 
IV. Results 
 
An initial accounting of household income components, their change over time and the 
difference in these differences between households with RSE workers and those with 
applicants and with non-applicants is reported in Table 2. Seven components are considered: 
earnings in Tonga (based on individual reports for the previous week); net (i.e., also taking 
account of outbound) remittances of both money and goods from RSE workers (based on 
household reports on the previous six months), net remittances from other sources; the lump 
sum of repatriated earnings from returned RSE workers (based on a report by the returned 
worker); net returns from sales of fish, crops, livestock, tapa cloth and mats (based on 
household reports on an average month); the value of own-produced or own-captured food 
                                                 
6  If there are regions where the support of Xi  does not overlap for the treated and non-treated groups, 
matching can only be performed over the common support region. 
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consumed by the household (based on household reports for the previous week); and other 
income from investments, pensions, rentals, etc. (based on household reports for the previous 
fortnight). Some of these income sources are either a lump sum or may come in only part of 
the year (e.g. remittances from RSE workers) so we do not annualize them since that may 
wrongly imply a more continuous, and higher, income from some sources. Instead we present 
them on a semi-annual basis, which was roughly the period since the baseline survey and also 
corresponds to the period for which RSE related income might accrue, given the seven month 
restriction on time spent in New Zealand. We will make estimates of annual income once data 
are available from wave 3 of the survey to add to the semi-annual income from wave 2. 
 
RSE RSE Applicants Nonapplicants Non-RSE
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (e)-(f) (e)-(g) (e)-(h)
Earnings in Tonga 163 360 ** 346 *** 353 *** -10 80 74 76 -90 -83 -86
Net remittances (from RSE) 355 1 *** 0 *** 0 *** 355 1 0 0 354 *** 355 *** 354 ***
Net remittances (from other) 50 85 ** 98 *** 92 *** -22 5 13 9 -27 -34 * -31 *
Repatriated RSE earnings 386 0 *** 0 *** 0 *** 386 0 0 0 386 *** 386 *** 386 ***
Agricultural & informal sales 33 96 *** 101 *** 99 *** -215 -164 -252 -213 -51 36 -2
Subsistence production 809 918 921 920 457 448 385 413 8 71 43
Other income 0 0 2 1 0 -3 2 0 3 -2 0
Total Household Income 1795 1460 ** 1469 ** 1465 ** 951 367 222 287 584 *** 728 *** 664 ***
Cash expenditure 381 396 398 397 -72 -127 -361 -257 55 288 185
Total Household Consumptiona 1190 1315 1319 1317 384 321 25 157 63 360 228
Sample size 114 116 145 261 114 116 145 261 230 259 375
Applicants Non-applicants Non-RSE
Table 2: Household Income Components, Changes from Baseline and Difference in Differences for RSE, Applicant and Non-applicant Households in Tonga
Difference in Differences (vs Control Groups)
Note: The RSE households are only those where the worker had returned to Tonga by wave 2 of the survey (households where the worker was still in New Zealand are not included in Table 2. 
The non-RSE group is the sum of applicants and non-applicants.
aTotal Household Consumption is comprised of cash expenditure plus consumption of subsistence production.
*** = significant at 0.01, ** = significant at 0.05, * = significant at 0.1. In columns (b) to (d) significance is for comparison with column (a). In the difference in differences columns the significance is for comparison with zero.
Applicants Non-applicants Non-RSE
Income Components (Pa'anga/capita/6 months) Change in Income Components (from Baseline)
 
 
 Almost half of income for RSE households and more than half for the other 
households is from subsistence production (Table 2, columns (a) to (d)). Repatriated RSE 
earnings and net remittances from RSE workers are the next most important income sources 
for RSE households, followed by earnings in Tonga. For non-RSE households, earnings in 
Tonga are the second most important income source. Across all sources, the per capita income 
of RSE households is approximately 300 pa’anga higher than for applicant and non-applicant 
households. However this is not a valid estimate of the treatment effect of participating in the 
RSE, since it does not take account of the baseline differences between the groups of 
households shown in Table 1. 
 
 To get closer to a valid treatment effect, we first consider the change in each income 
component, relative to the baseline level, which is reported in columns (e) to (h). The per 
capita (semi-annual) income for RSE households is 950 pa’anga higher than at baseline, with 
the biggest contribution from a rise in the value of subsistence production,7 followed by 
                                                 
7  The baseline survey was fielded at the end of the dry season in Tonga while the second wave 
survey was fielded 1-2 months after the wet season ended. In addition there is a considerable 
amount of feasting for church and family ceremonies in Tonga in May and June, which involve 
killing pigs. This consumption and rainfall seasonality and a domestic inflation rate of 12% at the 
time of the wave 2 survey may account for the rise in recorded value of subsistence production. 
The other seasonal pattern is that the main agricultural cash crop in Tonga is squash, which is 
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repatriated RSE earnings and net remittances from RSE workers. However, this change in 
income for RSE households is also not a valid estimate of the treatment effect of participating 
in the RSE, since it does not allow for the possibility that incomes might have increased from 
the baseline values irrespective of RSE participation. Indeed, columns (f) and (g) show that 
both applicant and non-applicant households also experienced income increases, mainly due 
to higher subsistence production but also due to higher earnings. 
 
 Instead it is the difference in differences which take account of both pre-existing 
income differences between the groups of households and the growth in incomes which 
would have occurred anyway. These show that per capita income for RSE households 
increased by almost 600 pa’anga, relative to the increase recorded for applicant households 
and by over 700 pa’anga relative to the rise for non-applicant households. There is little 
evidence of crowding out, whereby some traditional sources of income fall once non-
traditional (RSE) incomes become available, with the only statistically significant result being 
a slight fall in net remittances from non-RSE sources (only relative to the non-applicants). 
The difference in differences is larger when compared with non-applicant households, 
suggesting some self-selection into the RSE applicant pool and making the applicant 
households the better counterfactual for what would have happened to the RSE households if 
they had not sent a worker to New Zealand. 
 
 However even the differences in differences between RSE and applicant households 
include some households in the comparison who may not be very similar. Propensity score 
matching is a way to deal with these non-comparable households, by restricting the estimation 
of treatment effects to just those households that obey the common support condition. In order 
to implement this, we use the levels and squares of the baseline variables listed in Table 1 as 
covariates, and estimate propensity scores for RSE households that range from 0.065 to 0.989 
with a mean of 0.657. The propensity scores for applicant households are much lower, 
ranging from 0.001 to 0.928, with a mean of 0.333.8 Figure 1 illustrates these in the form of 
kernel densities. It is apparent that there while some applicant households have characteristics 
like those of RSE households, many others do not. Therefore in all of the results that follow, 
estimation of the average treatment effect is restricted to the area of common support, where 
the two distributions overlap.  
                                                                                                                                                        
harvested and exported at the end of the dry season, and so would not show up in the reference 
period for the wave 2 survey. 
8  If applicant and non-applicant households are combined, the propensity scores range from 0.00 to 
0.900, with a mean of 0.214. 
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Figure 1: Propensity Scores for RSE Households and Applicant Households 
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Table 3 reports estimates of the treatment effects for total per capita income and 
consumption, with either applicants or all non-RSE households used as the control group. We 
also show results for log income and consumption, which is less sensitive to outliers and for 
which the treatment effect is approximately a percentage change arising from having a 
household member seasonally work in New Zealand. These estimates suggest that per capita 
income for residents of RSE households increased by an average of 520 pa’anga, matching 
against applicant households, or by 570 pa’anga matching against both applicant and non-
applicant households.  
 
Welfare indicator
Total household income per capita (PCY) 522 153 3.41 566 124 4.56
ln(PCY) 0.508 0.133 3.81 0.569 0.112 5.06
Total consumption per capita (PCCONS) -1 161 0.01 49 99 0.50
ln(PCCONS) 0.029 0.095 0.31 0.088 0.094 0.93
t -statistic 
on ATT
Table 3: Propensity Score Matching Estimates of Average Treatment Effects on Per Capita Monetary Welfare in Tonga from RSE Participation
Note: The ATT estimates only use observations that satisfy the common support assumption (n=97 in the control group of applicant households and n=181 when both applicant and 
non-applicant households are used) and come from a kernel matching procedure. 
The standard errors are obtained via 100 bootstrap replications.
The covariates used for estimating the propensity scores are the levels and squares of the baseline characteristics listed in Table 1.
Applicant households
Set of households used as the control group
Applicant + non-applicant households
Average 
treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT)
Bootstrap 
standard 
error
t -statistic 
on ATT
Average 
treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT)
Bootstrap 
standard error
 
 
These estimates are lower by about 60 pa’anga and 100 pa’anga, compared with the 
simple difference in difference estimates in Table 2. That the treatment effects estimate falls 
by more when the non-applicants are included in the matching suggests that the applicants are 
the better counterfactual group for what would have happened to RSE households without any 
seasonal migration. This point is emphasized when considering the sample sizes that result 
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from imposing the common support restriction; 84% (97/116) of the applicant sample are still 
used as a control group but only 69% (181/261) of the combined applicant and non-applicant 
sample are used. 
 
The results in Table 3 for log per capita total income suggest that residents of 
households with RSE workers have 66-76% higher incomes than either applicant households 
or all non-RSE households.9 Two caveats to this estimate are, first, that it is for a six-month 
period and only some of the income sources could be relied upon in the other six months of a 
year, given the seasonal nature of RSE employment, and second, the repatriated earnings of 
RSE workers are assumed to be pooled with other forms of household income, when in fact 
the worker may treat this as capital rather than as income and may not pool it with other 
members. 
 
There is no apparent effect on per capita consumption from participation in the RSE. 
The treatment effects on the consumption variables are all statistically insignificant and close 
to zero. There was also no apparent impact on consumption in the difference in difference 
estimates in Table 2. It will take longer term monitoring to determine whether the higher 
income of RSE households ultimately translates into higher consumption. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
Seasonal work programs are an increasingly discussed feature of global agriculture but there 
is no formal evidence evaluating their development impacts. In this study we find large short-
term impacts on household incomes for Tongan participants in the new Recognized Seasonal 
Employer program which allows up to seven months work per year in New Zealand 
horticulture and viticulture. The per capita income for the residents of participating 
households is increased by over 500 pa’anga (equivalent to almost US$300), although there is 
no apparent impact on consumption. 
 
 Our results also illustrate the importance of formal evaluation methods and suitable 
data. For example, the impacts would be understated if just a cross-sectional survey was used 
which ignored pre-existing differences between participants and other households. 
Conversely, impacts would be overstated by just looking at the change in income for 
participants without considering income changes amongst control groups. Impacts would also 
be overstated if households that are quite unlike are compared in a standard regression 
approach. More flexible methods of comparing households via propensity score matching are 
likely to give the most valid estimates of treatment effects and can best inform the ongoing 
debates about the role of seasonal work programs as a development mechanism. 
                                                 
9  These are calculated as 100×[exp (0.508) – 1] and 100×[exp (0.569) – 1]. 
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